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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
JOSEPH G. TOOMBS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JACK DONALD TOOMBS, ROLAND 
J. TOOMBS, individually and as 
Guardian ad litem of the said Jack 
Donald Toombs, a minor; ALMA 
TOOMBS, EDRIS GLASMANN, and 
J. M. TOOMBS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8665 
The appellant in his statement of facts deals only very 
generally with the facts of this case and uses this statement 
to detail the proceedings had in this case and to comment 
upon the pleadings and the respective claims and allega-
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tions of the parties. Under Points I and II of his argument, 
the appellant attempts to detail the evidence presented at 
the trial and it must be here noted that, in order to sup-
port his contention of error on the part of the trial court, 
appellant recites only that evidence favorable to him. Even 
in cases of this kind, it is customary to rely upon the trial 
judge's findings as to the facts where there is evidence to 
support those findings as he alone had the opportunity of 
listening to the witnesses, observing their demeanor and of 
determining the 'veight and credence to be given each of 
them. 
On page 2 of his brief appellant details the family 
relationship of the plaintiff and the defendants and then 
says "It is therefore evident that the defendants are in close 
relationship one with the other, not only by family but also 
by reason of their activities conjointly in operating land 
adjacent to the Cedar Springs land in Box Elder County." 
It is respectfully submitted that the only evidence of this 
close relationship in the entire record is the above state-
ment of counsel. The plaintiff fed cattle for the defendant, 
Alma Toombs, in 1904 and 1905 (R. 45) and worked for 
this same defendant in those same years (R. 42), and had 
one real estate transaction 'vith him evidently at about the 
same time, although the evidence presented does not specify 
the year (R. 45). 
We believe that this statement of facts should contain 
the facts as presented by the evidence elicited at the trial 
and that the better way to present them by brief is with 
reference to the plaintiff's complaint in order that this 
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Court may have the opportunity to clearly see what was 
claimed and what was proved and wherein the proof was 
lacking. 
The amended complaint of the plaintiff (R. 500 and 
501) alleges that title to the land in question was taken in 
the name of J. M. Toombs by deed on or about March 21, 
1913, and that the plaintiff was and is the owner of a one-
third interest in said land; that the said J. M. Toombs openly 
acknowledged the interest of the plaintiff; that in the month 
of July, 1948, the said J. M. Toombs, who is the plaintiff's 
father, conveyed the land by vvarranty deed to Edris Glas-
mann, the plaintiff's sister, who was originally a party 
to this action, and plaintiff alleges that said conveyance was 
in trust to convey to him the one-third interest mentioned 
above and to sell to him the remaining one-third for "an 
amount to be agreed upon between the parties, which said 
amount was to be the reasonable value of said land and 
not what the same might be purchased for on competitive 
bidding." This amended complaint further claimed that 
Edris G·lasmann well knew that plaintiff was the owner of 
a one-third interest in this land and accepted the trust just 
above described but thereafter failed to execute the terms 
of this trust; and the complaint originally sought damages 
against both the plaintiff's sister and father, Edris Glas-
mann and J. M. Toombs. 
The actual evidence introduced showed that plaintiff's 
claimed ownership was based upon work performed for 
his father during the year 1905 and consisted of feeding 
cattle for a period of five and one-half months (R. 41 and 
42). There is not an iota of other or additional evidence 
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to support this alleged one-third interest and we earnestly 
suggest that the claim is as ridiculous as it sounds. All of 
the evidence introduced in support of the so-called construc-
tive trust negatives this alleged interest. Under the new 
rules of civil procedure it is apparently possible to take in-
consistent positions as far as the pleadings are concerned, 
but we do not believe it to be proper to maintain inconsistent 
positions after judgment and upon appeal. However, the 
plaintiff appellant continues to do so_ in this case; and his 
evidence and that of his witness, Arnold Christensen, con-
clusively show that he was attempting to purchase the 
entire property from his sister, and the plaintiff at this 
stage of the proceeding never asserted his alleged one-third 
interest. 
On page 10 of appellant's brief the following statement 
appears: "Exhibit 3 was admitted in evidence (R. 109-
110) ." We have carefully read the two pages of the record 
referred to and do not find that this exhibit was there ad-
mitted and on page 111 of the record the trial court with 
reference to Exhibit 3 states: 
"I think I'll take this under advisement and 
study this for a little while." 
Neither the reporter in his index nor the writers of this 
brief after a careful review of the entire record can find 
that this Exhibit 3 was ever admitted into evidence. It 
was, therefore, most improper for the appellant to quote 
from this Exhibit in his brief and we desire to emphasize 
this impropriety as it is the only place in this entire record 
where any person besides the plaintiff himself made any 
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statement affirmatively as to this claimed one-third interest. 
And it is only proper to note that the Exhibit was an affi-
davit made by a ninety year old man on October 18, 1948, 
som.e three months after he had executed a warranty deed 
to this same property to his daughter and some 43 years 
after the alleged consideration was supposedly furnished to 
establish this fictitious interest. And the Exhibit does not 
even mention that the interest was one-third but is silent 
in this respect. The exhibit was patently inadmissible. 
The amended complaint claimed that the plaintiff's 
sister accepted the conveyance in trust from plaintiff's 
father to convey to him the alleged one-third and to sell to 
him the remainder. The evidence of the plaintiff's two 
sisters, Deo Louise Gale (R. 290-299) and Edris Glasmann 
(R. 390-415), not only do not support such a trust and its 
acceptance, but completely negative any such a claim. And 
finally we must note that, although plaintiff's amended 
complaint joined both his father and his sister, Edris Glas-
mann, and sought $2500.00 damages against them, the file 
does not show that they were ever served with summons 
and the record does show that the matter was dismissed 
as to these two defendants. In connection with the discus-
sion as to constructive trusts, it will be necessary to again 
refer to this dismissal. 
Paragraph 8 of said amended complaint attempts to 
lay the foundation for the constructive trust by charging 
Alma Toombs with the making of certain alleged promises 
(R. 502). Paragraph 9 alleges a confidential relationship, 
paragraph 10 the breach and paragraph 11 that the 
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claimed representations of Alma Toombs were fraudulell 
(R. 503). 
With respect to Alma Toombs, he testified that he di~ 
go to Ogden for the plaintiff, talked with the plaintiff' 
sisters and reported to the plaintiff "I told him I wouldn' 
buy the property for him, because he could buy it just a 
well as I could" (R. 330). Lillian Toombs, Alma's wifE 
confirmed this statement (R. 368, 369) . As to the allege~ 
confidential relationship, we have heretofore in the secon1 
paragraph of this brief commented upon it and again urg, 
that this Court scrutinize this claim most carefully. To u 
it is apparent that the plaintiff appellant has assumed sue] 
a confidential relationship to exist merely because he allege 
in his amended complaint that it did. We have searche~ 
the record and the evidence is wholly lacking. 
This same amended complaint alleges that the prom 
ises of the defendant, Alma Toombs, were fraudulent an< 
the record again remains silent as to any proof of fraud 
It "'ould require an unbridled imagination to even infe1 
anything fraudulent from the entire record in this case. 
The record in this case is uncontradicted that the de 
fendants, Alma Toombs and Roland Thomas, each paid one 
half of the purchase price of this property when the sam~ 
was sold by Edris Glasmann and title thereto taken in th' 
name of the defendant, Jack Donald Toombs (R. 268 an< 
Exhibit F). And Jack Donald Toombs has since repaid hi~ 
grandfather, Alma Toombs, a good part of the purchas~ 
price so advanced by him (Exhibits M and N). But a mos· 
careful reading of the amended complaint filed by the plain 
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tiff in this cause reveals that Jack Donald Toombs and 
Roland Toombs are named as defendants in the title of the 
case, are mentioned in paragraphs one and two where the 
parties and their residences are delineated, are mentioned 
in paragraphs four and twelve in connection with a claimed 
eviction of the plaintiff of which no proof was offered, and 
Jack Donald Toombs is named in paragraph ten as the 
party in whose name the deed was taken. Neither of these 
defendants is charged in the complaint with having done 
a single act as far as the plaintiff is concerned; and, at the 
best and giving plaintiff credit for everything he testified 
to, the only claim that can be made against these defendants 
was that they had been informed that the plaintiff made 
some claim to the land in question. But the plaintiff's 
sister, who was selling this property, did not even recog-
nize this interest. 
We believe the fair inference of all of the evidence 
clearly supports the ruling of the trial court in refusing to 
impose a constructive trust in this case. First, he was en-
titled to believe the defendant, Alma Toombs, and the wit-
nesses who corroborated him, to the effect that he advised 
the plaintiff that he would not bid for him as he could do 
it just as well himself. Second, there was not a scintilla of 
evidence, nor was there any pleading, under which any 
type of constructive trust could be imposed as to the de-
fendants, Jack Donald Toombs and Roland J. Toombs. They 
made no promises to the plaintiff and were under absolutely 
no obligation to him. At this point we would ask the Court 
to observe the two letters sent from A. L. Glasmann to the 
plaintiff and to the defendant, Roland Toombs, each dated 
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October 14, 1948, and marked Exhibits "A" and "J", re-
spectively. The defendant, Roland Toombs, testified that 
the plaintiff showed him Exhibit A, being the letter sent 
the plaintiff, and that he read to the plaintiff the letter he 
had received which is Exhibit J (R. 427). This testimony is 
not contradicted. 
The two letters above referred to both stated that an 
offer had been received for the property and that it was 
the intention to complete the sale on October 19, 1948; and 
both the plaintiff and the defendant, Roland Toombs, were 
advised that this was in effect their last opportunity to bid 
on this property. Roland's testimony (R. 426) is to the 
effect that he told the plaintiff that he did intend to bid 
further on it and to the further effect that the plaintiff 
informed him that he was not interested, that the price was 
too high and that he would not bid further. This evidence 
is consistent with and is supported by these letters; the 
plaintiff's attempted denials of this conversation are not 
worthy of belief and the letters themselves show that his 
memory in this respect was faulty and very inaccurate. 
Again we would urge upon this Court that the findings of 
the trial judge should not be easily set aside in a case of 
this kind as the weight and credence to be given the testi-
mony of each witness can only be determined by the trier 
of the fact. 
Referring again to Exhibit J, it is our contention that 
the plaintiff could not possibly have been thereafter further 
misled. This letter and the conversation between Roland 
and the plaintiff when they read this letter could have no 
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other effect than to have put the plaintiff on notice that 
Roland proposed to bid further on this property. And again 
we urge the Court to remember that the plaintiff has never 
charged the defendant, Roland Toombs, with having made 
and thereafter breached any promise of any kind or with 
having at any time committed any wrongful act. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE FULLY SUP-
PORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING AND 
CONCLUSION THAT THE PLAINTIFF DID 
NOT OWN ANY PART OF THE LAND HERE 
IN QUESTION. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE FULLY SUP-
PORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS NO CON-
STRUCTIVE TRUST TO BE IMPOSED UPON 
THE PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED. 
POINT III. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE TRIAL 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO REOPEN THIS CASE. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE FULLY SUP-
PORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING AND 
CONCLUSION THAT THE PLAINTIFF DID 
NOT OWN ANY PART OF THE LAND HERE 
IN QUESTION. 
In the brief of appellant under the argument on this 
point, counsel use a total of twenty-four pages to detail and 
summarize the evidence favorable to them on both this 
point and the succeeding one, and in these twenty-four 
pages no authority of any kind is cited. We have under 
the statement of facts in this respondents' brief summarized 
the evidence favorable to the respondents. And, although 
it is repetitious, we maintain that the only evidence, other 
than the appellant's own statement, is contained in the 
affidavit quoted in appellant's brief which affidavit was 
never admitted in evidence. 
It would be proper to conclude the argu1nent under 
this point with the statement that this Court has many 
times stated and held that it will not on appeal disturb the 
findings of the trial court if there is any substantial evi-
dence supporting those findings and we submit here that 
there was a complete lack of evidence to support any other 
finding. This Court has also recently stated that the evi-
dence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
respondent upon appeal. Beck v. Jeppesen, 1 Utah 2d 127, 
262 P. 2d 760, and J.lalstrom v. Consolidated Theatres, 4 
Utah 2d 181, 290 P. 2d 689. 
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POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE FULLY SUP-
PORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS NO CON-
STRUCTIVE TRUST TO BE IMPOSED UPON 
THE PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED. 
Appellant commences his argument on this point with 
reference to the alleged promise of the defendant, Alma 
Toombs, to buy this property for appellant. We believe the 
record fairly and reasonably shows and supports a finding 
that, if any such promise had been made, it was rescinded. 
But, and of much more significance is the question as to 
what appellant proposes to do with the defendant, Roland 
Toombs, who was at least a joint purchaser. No where in 
his argument does he request that a constructive trust be 
imposed as against Roland and in the entire brief of appel-
lant there is not one reference to Exhibits A and J which 
have been mentioned many times in this brief. 
Corpus Juris Secundum in its treatise on trusts con-
tains three general statements, all supported by a multitude 
of cases, and any one of these three statements wholly and 
completely and conclusively sustains the judgment entered 
by the trial court on the facts as here presented. 
The first statement reads as follows: 
"More precisely, some fraudulent or unfair and 
unconscionable conduct is essential to create a con-
structive trust, and there must be some unjust en-
richment on the part of the trustee by something 
passing from the beneficiary or from someone else 
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on the beneficiary's behalf." 89 C. J. S. § 139 at p. 
1022. 
We submit that the trial court was entitled to find that no 
evidence was presented sufficient to fulfill this requirement. 
The second statement is this : 
"Likewise, a denial that any trust exists, or a 
resort to the statute of frauds to defeat the enforce-
ment of a parol trust or obligation, is not such a 
fraud as to give rise to a constructive trust." 89 C. 
J. S. § 139 at p. 1024. 
This statement needs no elaboration other than the com-
ment that the statute of frauds itself is intended to dis-
courage frauds and perjuries that would otherwise be com-
mitted by reason of the vagaries of the human mind and 
memory. 
And finally the statement is made that: 
"A high and extrordinary degree of proof is 
required in order to establish a constructive trust, 
and the evidence must be clear, definite, unequivocal 
and satisfactory, or such as to lead to but one con-
clusion, or as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the 
existence of the trust." 89 C. J. S. § 158 at p. 1079. 
We cannot too greatly emphasize that the entire record falls 
far short of the requirement thus imposed and would sup-
port only the result reached by the trial court. 
The Utah case of Jensen v. Ho-zvell, 75 Utah 64, 282 
Pac. 1034, holds that: 
"* * * The general rule also is that, to es-
tablish a trust by parol, the evidence must be clear, 
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unequivocal, and explicit, the property which is the 
subject-matter of the trust clearly and distinctly, 
and the purposes of the trust plainly, indicated, as 
well as the person or persons who are to be the bene-
ficiaries. Skeen v. Marriott, supra; 1 Perry on 
Trusts, supra; Beach on Trusts, § 52. And, as ex-
pressed in many of the adjudicated cases, the evi-
dence must be 'clear, satisfactory, and convincing.' 
Sheenan v. Sullivan, 126 Cal. 189, 58 P. 543, and 
cases there cited." * * * 
And, in this same case on page 1039 of the Pacific Re-
porter, the Court makes the following observations as to the 
evidence in that case: 
"Though the admissions as testified to by plain-
tiffs should be regarded as having been made, .yet 
the testimony with respect thereto is as frail and 
ineffectual to establish a trust in the property in 
question as is the testimony of the plaintiffs as to 
the declarations of the grantor prior to the making 
of the transfers. The admissions as testified to are 
just as equivocal, indefinite, and uncertain as to 
the property, the subject-matter of the trust, the 
nature, degree, and tenure of interest granted the 
wife, and as to what was to be given the plaintiffs. 
Such vague, indefinite, and enigmatical expressions 
and statements as testified to as admissions, unsup-
ported as they are by other facts and circumstances, 
or by conduct of the parties, cannot be regarded as 
being sufficient to create a trust and especially not 
to overcome the admitted written evidence of the 
conveyances and transfers of absolute and uncondi-
tional title of property possessed and controlled by 
the grantee as her own for these many years, and 
thereby divest her or her heirs of such title. Even 
though the whole of the evidence on behalf of the 
plaintiffs, when considered together, be regarded as 
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sufficient to support a finding of the alleged trust, 
yet, when the whole of the evidence in the record, 
that of the plaintiffs and of the defendants, and all 
the facts and circumstances shown therein, are con-
sidered together, we think it manifest that such a 
finding is against the clear weight of the evidence." 
In the case of Carpenter & Carpenter v. Kingham, 109 
P. 2d 463, 56 Wyo. 314, the Supreme Court of Wyoming 
states: 
"If we assume, however, that Kingham made 
the statement that he would protect plaintiff along 
with himself, the statement is altogether too vague 
and indefinite upon which to found a constructive 
trust. Counsel for defendant thinks that it means 
that defendant would protect plaintiff in the pend-
ing suit, but that there was nothing to protect. Per-
haps so. We might conjecture numerous other 
meanings. In Dunn v. Dunn, 59 Idaho 473, 83 P. 
2d 4 71, 4 7 4, the court stated that 'a constructive 
trust cannot arise out of vague, indefinite, ambigu-
ous or casual statements or declarations. It must 
be established by reasonably clear and definite 
statements or declarations or equally clear and def-
inite evidence of acts and conduct to that effect.' 
In Rubin v. Midlinsky, supra [321 Ill. 436, 152 N. E. 
219], the court stated that 'while counsel do not 
clearly state the character of trust which they con-
tend exists here, we gather that it is sought to es-
tablish a constructive trust. 'Vhile such trust may 
be established by parol testimony, the proof must 
be clear and convincing, and so strong, unequivocal, 
and unmistakable as to lead to but one conclusion.' 
3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, § 4 72, states: 'As 
with the proof of express and resulting trusts, so in 
the case of the establishment of constructive trusts, 
the courts have announced that they require "clear 
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and convincing" evidence. Other judicial expressions 
are even stronger in their demands. "If the evidence 
is doubtful or capable of reasonable explanation upon 
a theory other than the existence of the trust, it is 
not sufficient to support a decree declaring and en-
forcing the trust." Sometimes the requirement is 
stated to be that the facts leading to the decree es-
tablishing the constructive trust must be proved "by 
greater weight than the mere preponderance of the 
evidence" or beyond a reasonable doubt. These 
statements reflect judicial caution in accepting oral 
evidence which is intended to contradict absolute 
conveyances in deeds and wills and overturn record 
titles.' " 
Under all of the circumstances of this case and the 
authorities above quoted, we respectfully urge that it would 
have been error for the trial court to have imposed a con-
structive trust here. 
POINT III. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE TRIAL 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO REOPEN THIS CASE. 
We have carefully read appellant's argument concern-
ing this point as set forth in his brief and we are of the 
opinion that he has answered it himself. If counsel for one 
side or the other believe that their opposition is dilatory 
in the preparation of such findings, the rules clearly permit 
such counsel to prepare and submit the findings of their 
own. We respectfully submit that the motion to reopen was 
directed to the sound discretion of the trial court and noth-
ing has been here presented to show an abuse of that dis-
cretion. 
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On page 52 of appellant's brief appears the statement 
"the trial court manifestly abused its discretion in refusing 
to reopen the matter after more than five years had elapsed 
from the submission of the case to it." Appellant again 
assumes that there are facts in the record to support such 
a contention whereas there are none. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court, in the recent case of Haws v. Jensen, 116 
Utah 212, 209 P. 2d 229, said: 
"The scope of the review of facts in equity cases 
has long been settled in this jurisdiction. In Stanley 
v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 2d 465, 466, we quoted 
with approval from Olivers v. El.tJganti, 61 Utah 475, 
214 P. 313, 315, where we stated that in equity cases, 
'the findings of the trial courts on conflicting evi-
dence will not be set aside unless it manifestly ap-
pears that the court has misapplied proven facts or 
made findings clearly against the weight of the evi-
dence.'" 
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the trial court 
is entitled to the full affirmance of this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE M. MASON, 
Attorney for Respondents. 
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